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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

N

on-South African street traders are often portrayed in
the South African media as “illegal”, ill-educated, new
arrivals who take opportunities from South Africans and
money from the country. The findings of this study challenge some of the basic myths about non-South African
street traders and their activities. The study also makes policy recommendations for changes in both immigration and customs policy on
informal cross-border trade.
The study examines the participation of non-South African street
traders in regional cross-border trade and its implications for customs
and immigration policy.
The study focuses on traders in the handicraft and curio sector, as
they are significant participants in cross-border trade. The report is
based on semi-structured interviews with 107 non-South African (73
from the SADC region) and 21 South African traders of handicrafts
and curios in Johannesburg and Cape Town.
We also interviewed 22 South Africans who were employed by nonSouth African traders and 23 Zimbabwean curio sellers in Harare and
Masvingo, Zimbabwe.
We then interviewed key informant traders as well as local government officials and representatives of the South African Department of
Home Affairs. Mozambican traders, under-represented in the study, will
be the subject of a subsequent report.
The findings of this study contradict or challenge much of the conventional wisdom about the informal sector and the migrants who work
in it.
Myth: Participants in the informal sector are poorly educated and illiterate
or semi-literate.
In this study, over 90% of non-South African respondents had some
secondary education. Nearly 40% had a formal qualification. Over twothirds had some form of further education or training; and 9% had some
university experience. With one exception all the South African
respondents had some secondary school education.
Myth: Informal sector participants are poverty-stricken and desperate people engaged in a struggle to “survive”.
The majority of respondents are pursuing a future as small entrepreneurs. Less than 50% were interested in finding formal employment and
less than 5% were actively seeking employment. Some 29% said they
had entered the business because they “enjoyed” trading and selfemployment and 7% categorised themselves as artists.
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Myth: Foreign migrants are flooding to South Africa to flee a desperate
situation at home.
Some 27% of the sample cite as the reason for coming to South
Africa the opportunities offered by South Africa’s tourist market; 24%
cited the strength of the economy or the rand; some 17% spoke more
generally of South Africa’s attractions.
Myth: The presence of non-South African traders is a new phenomenon.
Most non-SADC traders are recent entrants. However, most traders
from the SADC region have been travelling to South Africa to trade
since at least 1990, and some before.
Myth: Non-South Africans want to settle permanently in South Africa.
Some 71% of readers identified their home country as their “permanent home”. Only 4% said “South Africa”. The overwhelming majority
of married respondents and those with children said they did not want
to bring their families to South Africa.
Myth: The participation of non-South Africans in South Africa’s economy
is a net drain on the country. Foreigners drain wealth, they do not create it.
Cross-border traders invest the majority of their profits within the
country in the (formal) retail and manufacturing sectors.
Traders assist South African exports by taking goods out of South
Africa to sell in the region. Over 56% of all non-South Africans, but
78% of SADC respondents, take goods out of South Africa to trade.
Only 27% do not.
Exported goods include electronics, appliances, clothes, shoes,
household goods, and foodstuffs. These items are South African products which are being promoted by industrial and SADC export policy.
Estimates of the value of goods taken out of the country range from
R500 to R10 000 per trip. The majority take out goods valued between
R2 000 and R3 000. Most traders returned home between four and eight
times a year.
Official South African policy is to encourage trade with its SADC
partners. There is no sound economic reason why such trade should be
monopolised by large South African formal sector companies.
More than 50% of traders spend between 40% and 50% of their
earnings in South Africa.
Myth: Non-South African street traders compete unfairly with South
Africans and take away economic opportunity.
More than 20% of foreign traders employ South Africans in their
business operations.
Only 15% of traders did not bring goods with them to sell. Curios,
wood and stone carvings comprise 90% of the goods imported. The
remaining 10% consisted of wire, clothes and crochet work and leather
goods.
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Mozambican traders bring vegetables, nuts, and cloth. None of these
products are readily available within South Africa itself.
Myth: Non-South African traders from the continent have all entered
South Africa “illegally”.
Most traders from the region enter on visitors visas, which allow
people to enter but do not officially allow them to trade. There is no
system of trading permits in place. African traders from outside the
SADC region tend to be asylum seekers or refugees who are allowed to
trade. Most traders pass through official border posts and pay duty. Some
63% said they had problems with customs officials. Most cited the high
cost of duties, bribery and overcharging.
Myth: The Aliens Control Act is a suitable and efficient instrument for
regulating cross-border trade.
The present system of restrictive regulation has negative consequences for informal cross-border traders as well as for the South
African government. The issue of single-entry visas increases the workload of the issuing officers as traders have to constantly re-apply. Costs
to government and traders are high.
The ambiguous visa status of traders and complex tariff schedules
present opportunities for corrupt Home Affairs and Customs and Excise
officials as well as police.
Duties paid at the border are a significant drain on the profit margin
of traders. They also come with costs to the Department of Customs
and Excise who have to administer the gathering of relatively small
amounts of duties against complex tariff schedules.
Based on the findings of this study, various policy recommendations
can be made:
• The introduction of a new temporary permit category for individual informal sector cross-border traders, as recommended in
the Draft Green Paper on International Migration, should be
considered. The permit would allow multiple entry, reducing
administrative costs and releasing Home Affairs officials to deal
with more pressing concerns. It would also remove the ambiguous status of non-South African traders, remove opportunities
for corruption and improve the regulation of the system.
• A duty free allowance on goods carried by persons holding a
trading permit should be considered. It would reduce administrative costs for Customs and Excise officials; free them to pursue
smugglers of illegal goods; reduce opportunities for corruption;
and encourage the development of small enterprises.
• Reciprocal arrangements should be negotiated with neighbouring countries to ensure that South African traders are not disadvantaged.
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•

Training in accounting and marketing should be introduced for
South African informal sector participants as black South
African entrepreneurship was suppressed by apartheid.
The Department of Arts and Culture could follow the example of
the Zimbabwean government and offer training in traditional skills in
arts and crafts as South Africa currently only produces a small range of
handicrafts and curios for the tourist market.
Access to start-up capital is problematic for new entrants to the market. Micro-financing schemes should be considered as they would place
South African traders in an advantageous position.
At the same time as South African traders have been attacking nonSouth African traders, the South African government has endeavoured
to build trade links with neighbouring and other African states. The
study places the activities of informal cross-border trade within the
wider context of regional trade networks and flows of goods. The policy
recommendations made here reflect the move to free up regional trade
and a concern that small entrepreneurs should not be disadvantaged.
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INTRODUCTION

I

n August 1997, protests on the streets of Johannesburg against
non-South African street traders erupted into violence and intimidation (see Vignette A). The demonstrators physically assaulted
the traders, stole their goods and forced them from their stands,
sometimes at gunpoint. These attacks were accompanied by angry
and vitriolic anti-immigrant rhetoric. Many traders lost not only their
stock but also the sites allocated to them by the City Council. But most
non-South African traders in the Central Business District (CBD) and
Hillbrow were able to return to their stands within days. Traders in
Yeoville stayed off the streets for another week, returning only after
council officials intervened. The official response to the attacks was surprisingly muted, although it is clear that some in public office are not
immune from the misconceptions that motivated the attacks.
The results of this study challenge some of the more common myths
about non-South African street traders. In the handicraft/curio sector of
street trade, at least, the traders are not ill-educated people fleeing
poverty and seeking to survive but are more likely to be relatively well
educated entrepreneurs seeking business opportunities.
The participation of traders from the SADC region in the South
African informal sector and in informal cross-border trade is not a post1994 election phenomenon, but dates back to 1990, if not earlier.
Most traders do not intend to settle in South Africa, dividing time
between South Africa and their home countries. They leave their families at home, and so should be called cross-border traders or migrants,
not immigrants. Most want to stay in the informal sector (or move into
formal sector) trade.
Only a minority is interested in formal employment in South Africa,
and it is doubtful that many are seeking work, or would be able to find
any. The overwhelming majority of traders see themselves as selfemployed entrepreneurs, not frustrated wage workers.
Cross-border trade forms a significant part of the business of traders
from South Africa’s neighbours. Rather than being a drain on the South
African economy, as is commonly assumed, they contribute to the economy through their expenditures when in South Africa, as well as in the
goods they purchase for export.
The goods bought into, and taken out of, South Africa not only mirror formal sector trade in the region, but come from sectors of manufacturing that South Africa is trying to promote in its export market in the
SADC region (machinery and appliances, vehicles, plastic and rubber
products, foodstuffs and textiles and clothing).1
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VIGNETTE A
RIOTING CITY HAWKERS
“It’s easy to moralise when your own livelihood is not at stake, but
it is worrying that South Africans — forgetting the foreign havens
of the struggle years — should have become so intolerant”
(Editorial in The Star, 28 August 1997).
Hawkers protesting against foreign vendors in Johannesburg’s city
centre went on the rampage yesterday, smashing windows, looting
shops and other hawkers’ goods, and assaulting foreigners. About
300 hawkers left their stalls on the pavements empty to attend a
meeting at the Library Gardens, where the “invasion” of the
hawking trade by foreigners was discussed.
The foreign traders had also abandoned their stalls because they
feared attacks from the South Africans. The locals vented their
anger at the foreigners for “infesting the city streets and killing our
businesses” and expressed their frustration at the Government for
“doing nothing to rid the streets of foreigners”.
Police said hawkers later marched towards Hillbrow, smashing
windows and looting shops on the way. They assaulted foreign and
local hawkers who had not heeded the “no-selling” call. Several
hawkers were arrested.
Moffat Sebulelo, a spokesman for the Greater Johannesburg
Hawkers’ Planning Council, said the locals would forcibly remove
the foreigners from Johannesburg city streets today.
He said they would do this because business had become
unprofitable since foreigners started flocking into South Africa.
“They sell their goods cheaply and we cannot compete with them.
This way our business is destroyed. And they also sell counterfeit
goods,” he claimed.
But Sebulelo, 37, who became a hawker in 1970, distanced
his organisation from the unruly behaviour of the looters yesterday.
He said the hawkers’ meeting was “hijacked” by a group of jobless
people who then marched without permission.
On 9 July the hawkers (had) marched to the Metropolitan
Centre in Braamfontein, where they delivered a memorandum
demanding the suspension of the construction of stalls until their
problems were addressed. The hawkers plan to march to the
Department of Home Affairs on 7 September to demand the
expulsion of foreign hawkers from the city centre.
Source: The Star, 14 August 1997.
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Informal cross-border trade may therefore indirectly help to create
formal sector employment in South Africa. By reinvesting their informal sector profits in the purchase of stock and goods for export, the
traders challenge the notion that they simply drain money from the
South African economy.
By using the proceeds to build enterprises in their home country and
educate their children, they may also lessen the number of future
migrants seeking income-earning opportunities in South Africa. By
employing South Africans, the traders challenge the idea that they are
taking opportunities from, not providing opportunities for, local people.
This study examines the participation of non-South African informal sector street traders and hawkers in regional cross-border trade and
the implications of this trade for immigration and customs policy.
The study focuses on traders in the handicraft and curio sector who
are significant participants in cross-border trade. This is the first such
study to examine the participation of non-South Africans in crossborder trade and street trading from a South African locus.2 As such, it
provides an introduction to the complex network of trade conducted by
small entrepreneurs in the region.
The first section provides a brief overview of relevant information
and debates on the nature of the informal sector and volume of regional
trade. In the second, the actual research design and methodology is discussed. The ensuing sections present the main findings of the research
and analyse the regulatory framework which governs informal cross-border trade. The study concludes with policy recommendations.

SOUTH AFRICA’S TRADE ADVANTAGE WITH AFRICA

O

ver the past decade, and particularly since 1990, South
African trade with other African countries has grown
rapidly (Figures 1 and 2). Export trade with Southern
African Development Community (SADC) countries
outside the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
almost tripled between 1992 and 1996.3
South Africa’s export trade with Customs Union partners amounted
to over R15 billion in 1993. Trade with other SADC countries reached
R9.2 billion in 1995 and R17.5 billion in 1996. Including the SADC
and SACU countries, 31.7% of South Africa’s total export trade in
1993 was with Africa. Excluding trade with SACU, trade with other
African countries amounted to 12.8% of export trade.4
Table 1 shows the enormous advantage that South Africa enjoys
with its major trading partners in Africa. The primary trading partners

7

TRADING PLACES: CROSS-BORDER TRADERS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMAL SECTOR

outside
SADC are
Kenya,
Ghana, and
Nigeria.
The question raised
by Vignette
B is: Why
should
South Africa
expect it to
be all oneway traffic?
If South
African merchants are
making a
“big push”
into Africa virtually unhindered, then surely non-South African traders
ought to enjoy reciprocal rights and privileges in South Africa?
This observation is as relevant for informal as formal trade.

VIGNETTE B
SOUTH AFRICANS FLOOD INTO AFRICA
Since South Africa-based Game stores opened a discount outlet last
year in Windhoek, shoppers from Namibia’s northern neighbour,
Angola, have been arriving in waves.
The Angolans travel by bus and truck more than 600km south
from the border to purchase furniture, appliances and clothing,
often to take back home to sell.
Cross-border shopping happens at other Game outlets as well:
In Pietersburg, Zimbabweans are prominent buyers, and the Game
store in Nelspruit has become synonymous on weekends with
droves of Mozambicans. With 24 stores already in South Africa
and two in neighbouring countries, Game has launched a strong
expansion drive that will take its products to the rest of Africa in 25
stores it plans to open by 2006.
“It’s becoming a natural progression for us to move further and
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further north,” said Dan Barrett, managing director of the Durbanbased discount chain. “You can dominate a market pretty quickly.”
Once rejected as the economic storm troopers of white-minority
rule and rapacious Western capitalism, South African businesses
are cutting a path through the continent.
Led by the gold and diamond mining houses that have long been
the vanguard of its multinational economic power, the expansion of
South African business ties on the continent has spread into a host
of other sectors. South African fast-food shops and clothing stores
are in Zimbabwe. South African Breweries is in eight African
countries, including Uganda, where it purchased a controlling stake
in a brewery last month.
A South African cable TV network, Multichoice, can be viewed
as far north as Kenya. South African supermarket chains are
sprouting in Zambia and Mozambique, and all over the continent
one can find South African hotels, banks, restaurant chains, construction companies, rail and road engineering projects, sugar
processors, paper manufacturers, mineral, oil and gas exploration
efforts, even auto service centres.
Since 1990, direct foreign investment by South Africa’s private
sector has increased at least threefold, to $25 billion in 1995, the
latest year for which figures are available. Investments in Africa
account for a small portion of this total, but foreign exchange
requests in the pipeline indicate that Africa’s share will grow dramatically, an official of the SA Reserve Bank said.
Among shoppers, demand for the growing South African presence is high. In August, when a Shoprite Checkers supermarket
food chain opened in Maputo, the Mozambican capital, a near riot
broke out amid the crush of the thousands clamouring for the grand
opening sale.
Governments are clamouring too — for investment. Kenya’s
officials recently appealed for more, in part to help level its trade
imbalance with Pretoria.
In Zambia, which has virtually rolled out the red carpet to all
comers as part of its privatisation drive, recent figures show that
South African firms have overtaken the British to become the leading foreign business licensees.
Angola was a Cold War enemy yet Angolan business officials
are running ads in South African newspapers inviting joint venture
investors. As South Africa emerges after dismantling apartheid, it
has become not only a target of the economic trend toward globalisation, but a player in it as well.
Source: Sunday Times Finance, 9 November 1997.
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The trade balance between South Africa and the SADC countries
outside SACU is extremely uneven. According to some experts, it will
become even more imbalanced as regional trade develops.6 Between
1994 and 1996 the ratio of exports to imports with non-SACU SADC
countries increased from 4.4:1 to 6.9:1.7 The imbalance could have serious negative implications for employment opportunities in the region.
South Africa’s links with countries in East and West Africa may
appear to be more tenuous. Sanctions and the isolation of the apartheid
years restricted trade between South Africa and the rest of the continent. Trade still occurred. By 1988, 10% of South Africa’s export trade
went to the rest of Africa and the country had become the seventh
largest trading partner of the rest of the continent.8 Since 1992, export
trade with the rest of Africa has increased almost threefold from R1.5
billion in 1992 to almost R5.5 billion in 1996.9 The trade imbalance
between South Africa and non-SADC African countries is not as acute
as with SADC countries. However, the ratio of exports to imports grew
from 2.8:1 in 1994 to 3.9:1 in 1996.10
Countries that seem to be the source of “new” migrants and refugees
trading on the street — particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zaire), Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon and Senegal
— have strong or growing trade links with South Africa. Zaire, the
Ivory Coast and Gabon established political links with the previous
government in the 1980s. In 1988, trade with Zaire ranked second
among all
African countries.11 By
1996 Zaire
was South
Africa’s largest
export market
in Africa outside the
SADC, closely
followed by
Mauritius and
Kenya.12
With the
exception of
Cameroon, all
these countries show an
increase in the
volume of
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export trade between 1992
Table 1. South African Export Trade with Africa,
1993-1996
and 1996. The export marCountry
Rands (billion)
kets of Ghana, Mali,
Trade
Nigeria and Senegal, all
imbalance
Exports
Imports
countries that are establishin SA's
favour
ing new ties with South
Africa, have shown massive SADC
Zimbabwe
15.69
4.59
11.10
increases in trade.
Mozambique
7.66
0.39
7.27
The growth in South
Zambia
6.75
0.49
6.26
Africa’s trade with the
Malawi
3.55
0.97
2.58
region and the rest of
3.01
0.09
2.92
Africa, and the re-negotia- Mauritius
Angola
2.91
0.28
2.63
tion of trade agreements,
DRC (Zaire)
2.62
1.47
1.15
has implications for inforTanzania
1.42
0.08
1.36
mal cross-border trade. Like
Rest of Africa
16.26
4.70
11.56
formal trade, informal trade
between South Africa and
other countries in the region is growing. There are indications that
South Africans are aggressively participating in this movement of goods
throughout the region (see Vignette B).
The growing informal sector trade as well as the establishment of
formal sector South African retail outlets in the region indicates that,
although the other countries’ economies are not as strong as South
Africa’s, a market exists for South Africa’s manufactured goods. Given
the limitations of the handicraft/curio sector it may be useful if other
possible imports from the region could be identified to encourage the
participation of South Africans in informal sector regional trade.
Informal trade should be seen as an integral component of a broader
movement of goods and be included in regional trade agreements.
Informal trade provides support, income and development to a significant number of people from the region. The present study, though
focused on only a small sector of street trading, indicates that informal
cross-border trade forms an integral part of the regional economy.

DIMENSIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMAL SECTOR

H

ow significant is the informal sector in South and
Southern Africa? In 1994 the World Bank estimated that
the contribution of informal sector output to the total
GDP of African countries ranged between 20% and
50%.13 In Mozambique, De Vletter estimates the contribution of the informal sector at around 40% of GNP in 1996.14 Informal
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sector street trading in South Africa’s cities has grown significantly in
the 1990s following the lifting of restrictions on movement and street
trading. The sector encompasses a wide range of vending, productive,
service and trade activities in rural and urban areas, in the inner city,
peri-urban and suburban communities as well as in informal settlements.
Although distinctions are made between the informal and formal sectors, close relationships exist between them. These range from the subcontracting of work to the informal sector to the use of inputs in informal sector trade and production which have been purchased in the formal sector. Street trading and cross-border trade are just components of
these diverse informal sector activities.
We do not know quite how many people participate in this diverse
and mobile sector of economic activity. In 1996, the South African
Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) estimated that 16% of South
Africa’s economically active population was engaged in the informal
sector.15 However, the number of traders certainly fluctuates seasonally
as well as over the course of a month. Little is also known about the
extent of informal cross-border trade between South Africa and the
region and its relationship to formal trade patterns and to street trading,
although one or two suggestive studies have been conducted outside
South Africa.
A 1994 study of female informal traders in Zimbabwe, for example,
highlights the complex network of informal trade relationships that
exist in the region. The study shows that strong networks exist between
Zimbabwe and South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. Of
the 23 traders interviewed, 22 travelled to South Africa, but many also
visited Botswana, Zambia and Mozambique. Significantly, the majority
of the cross-border traders interviewed had started cross-border trading
in the early 1990s or before.16 A 1996 study of the informal sector in
Maputo identifies informal cross-border trade with South Africa as an
important source of goods for informal sector vendors. Significantly, the
study identifies South African informal and formal sector traders in
fruits and vegetables as a major source for Mozambican vendors in
Maputo.17
The Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council
(GJTMC) recently estimated that there were 10 000 informal traders
within the official CBD of the city.18 A second report by the GJTMC
estimated there were approximately 20 000 traders operating within the
purview of the GJTMC.19 A survey by the Community Agency for
Social Enquiry (CASE) in 1995 found that the number of stalls in the
central CBD ranged from 3 167 to 6 893 in separate counts. A further
enumeration found 4 569 stalls. The study discovered much lower densities of traders in the CBDs of Randburg, Roodeport and Sandton.20 A
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study of Mitchells Plain Town Centre in Cape Town in 1993 counted
between 332 and 557 stalls.21 In 1994, 44 152 licences for street trading
were issued in Pretoria (since then the licensing system has been abandoned).22 In a rapidly changing and unregulated sector, such figures are
already dated and only provide an indication of the relative densities of
hawkers in different parts of the cities.
These studies pay little attention to the presence of non-South
African street traders. However, the CASE study found that 14% of its
interview sample of 1 114 were non-South African. The ratio of South
African to non-South African traders was similar (8-12%) over most of
the CBD. In high-density blocks, the proportion of non-South Africans
increased to 34%.23 Other recent studies of retailing in Johannesburg
suggest that non-South Africans are playing an increasing role in the
informal and small enterprise sector of the city’s economy.24

RESEARCH METHODS

T

he research material for this particular study was gathered
from four main sources. Firstly, a thorough search and
review of relevant literature on the South African informal
sector, street trading activities and cross-border trade was
undertaken. Secondly, a newspaper clippings file was compiled to monitor public debates as well as conceptions and representations of non-South African street traders.25 The report is based primarily
on the third source: extensive interviews with non-South African and
South African street traders in Johannesburg and Cape Town. Short
interviews were also conducted with traders in Harare and Masvingo
and with employees of non-South African traders. Fourthly, open-ended
interviews were conducted with Home Affairs and local government
officials in Harare, Maputo and Lebombo as well as in Johannesburg
and Cape Town (see List of Interviews).
Interviews with traders were conducted in Johannesburg (November
to December 1996) as well as Cape Town and Stellenbosch (January
1997). The study focused on men and women working in the handicraft/curio sector of street trading. Although not the focus of the study,
South Africans participating in the selling of handicrafts and curios
were also interviewed. As Mozambicans are under-represented in this
sector (none were identified in our initial study), a separate interview
schedule was established for Mozambican traders in August 1997.
Johannesburg was chosen as an appropriate site for investigation as it
has been identified by a number of official and other authorities as a
leading destination for non-South African African immigrants. Cape
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Town was selected as a comparative location as well as for city-specific
reasons. Firstly, it is the country’s largest foreign (and national) tourist
destination and is expanding economically, providing a market for
handicrafts and curios from the region. Secondly, the history of marketing and selling in Cape Town differs from that of Johannesburg. Thirdly,
street trading in Cape Town has largely been the preserve of coloured
South Africans but both the profiles of street traders and trading activities are changing. Fourthly, a number of immigrant street traders interviewed in Johannesburg indicated that they were thinking of moving to
Cape Town to pursue their activities.
In each city, sites were chosen where handicraft and curio sellers are
concentrated, including the William Nichol Highway (3 sites),
Rosebank, Greenside and Bruma Lake in Johannesburg. Interviews with
Mozambicans were all undertaken in areas of Johannesburg where the
Mozambican community and traders congregate: the Kerk Street area of
the CBD and Hillbrow. In Cape Town, interviews were conducted in
Greenmarket Square, Green Point Market, St George’s Mall, the station
area, on the roads to Cape Point, and in Stellenbosch.
A total of 107 non-South Africans (69 in Johannesburg, 38 in Cape
Town) were interviewed in the initial study. Only 10 Mozambicans
could be interviewed in August 1997. Unfortunately, in the interests of
safety, the interviews with Mozambicans had to be terminated following
the attacks on non-South Africans in Johannesburg in August 1997.
Some 21 South Africans trading in handicrafts and curios were also
interviewed. The questionnaire asked both open-ended and closed questions and took approximately one hour to administer.26 Longer openended interviews were conducted with key informants from Zimbabwe,
Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and
Mozambique. The focus on the
Table 2:
handicraft/curio sector excluded
Male Female Total
Mozambican and other traders who
Zimbabwe
34
6
40
do not participate in this sector,
Malawi
23
2
25
but who, according to key inforKenya
5
5
10
mants, form a significant part of
Mozambique
6
4
10
informal sector cross-border trade.
Zaire
4
3
7
Some 22 South Africans employed
Sudan
6
6
by non-South Africans in Cape
Swaziland
2
1
3
Town were also interviewed using a
Angola
1
2
3
short questionnaire. Later, 23
Zambia
2
2
Zimbabwean curio sellers were
Senegal
2
2
interviewed in Harare and
Ethiopia
2
2
Masvingo.
Not disclosed
2
2
All of the traders interviewed
Totals
87
25
112
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for this study were African. It seems that non-African traders do not
tend to engage directly in the handicraft/curio sector of street trading.
Whites and non-nationals from other countries certainly participate in
the sector, but largely in a more formal capacity as our interviews with
curio shop owners confirmed.
The majority of our interviewees came from Zimbabwe and Malawi.
Traders in Cape Town were more likely to have come from Central,
West and East Africa and to be refugees or asylum seekers than those in
Johannesburg. These differing demographic profiles in part reflect the
importance of cross-border trade to the businesses of regional traders
and the distance of Cape Town from borders with neighbouring states.
No Mozambicans were identified in the initial study as they are not
significant participants in the handicraft/curio sector. The supplementary study, before it was interrupted, was intended to redress this imbalance. Other traders in handicrafts and curios may also be under represented. Interviews with key informants suggested that many Swazi
traders travel only as far as Mpumalanga to buy and sell.
Similarly, women traders from the region appear to be under represented. Interviews with women traders in Harare suggest that not only
do they participate in less visible forms of trade (eg the sale of “traditional” dresses), but are only in South Africa for short periods, usually
at the month’s end.27 Further research is necessary to explore the role of
women traders in cross-border trade and to examine gender specific
issues.
The gender and national origins profile of the interview sample is
shown in Table 2.
In addition, several individuals from Uganda, Cameroon, Nigeria,
Mali and Ghana were interviewed. The demographic and social profile
of the sample shows the following:

AGE AND FAMILY STATUS
•

•

•

Only four of the traders were under 20. The majority (almost
60%) were aged between 20 and 29 years. Women traders tend
to be older than their male counterparts. An earlier study found
that non-South African traders were younger than South
African traders (77% under 35 compared to 63% of South
Africans).28
Just under 50% of the men interviewed were married, compared
with 66% of the women. Of the married traders, only 15% had
spouses living in South Africa. Of these, half were refugees and
one was married to a South African citizen.
Over 50% of male traders had no children. However, only 25%
of the women were childless. Family size ranged from one to
15

TRADING PLACES: CROSS-BORDER TRADERS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN INFORMAL SECTOR

•

nine children. The average family size of the men and women
with children was 2.76.
The traders also supported other dependants. More than 70%
said they had dependants to support. Of those without dependants, half lived in Cape Town and were predominantly
refugees. The number of dependants ranged from one to 13.
Most dependants who were not spouses or children were other
family members, particularly parents and siblings.

EDUCATION
Because of its associations with marginality and the struggle for survival,
studies of the informal sector tend to suggest that participants are poorly
educated. Certainly African migrants are often portrayed in South
Africa as illiterate peasants. However, the majority of traders in this
study indicated that they had some education. Only two said that they
had not been to school at all. The levels of education and training suggest that they would rate among the more educated in their home countries. In this sample:
• Only 6% had no secondary education (and are therefore probably functionally illiterate) while over 90% had some secondary
education.
• Nearly 40% had formal qualifications including 12 with O
Levels, six with A Levels, and nine with university experience.
• Over two-thirds had some form of further education or training.
This included university degrees; teaching experience; diplomas
(IATA airline ticketing, computing, graphic design, forestry,
photography, accountancy, catering, printing); secretarial, clerical and bookkeeping skills, welding, electrical and mechanic
certificates; artisanal and art training; sewing and cooking. One
Zimbabwean had been trained as a professional footballer.
• A number of Zimbabwean handicraft and curio sellers had been
trained at both private and government run institutions. Men
selling wire and tin goods (which have a significant market in
South Africa — far greater than in Zimbabwe, according to
respondents) said that they had been taught their craft at
school.
• With one exception, all the South African traders had some secondary school education, seven had matric and eight had some
form of further education or training. One was studying parttime for a B.Comm. degree.
The CASE study of the Johannesburg CBD (which surveyed 160
non-South Africans and 984 South Africans) found that foreign traders
were invariably better educated than South African traders. More than
16
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16% of non-South Africans had matric or higher compared to 9% of
South Africans. Only 4% of the non-South Africans had no education
compared to 11% of South Africans.
The stronger educational qualifications of South African traders in
our sample probably reflect the initiative and capital required to establish oneself in the handicraft/curio niche of street trading.
Both studies confirm that street selling (particularly of handicrafts) is
a profession dominated by people with a surprisingly high level of formal education. CASE found, for example, that 59% of the traders they
interviewed (including South Africans) had some secondary education
and 10% had matric.29 The Zimbabwean study of female informal sector
traders found that cross-border traders had more education than those
who did not participate in the sector.30 The study of Mozambican hawkers found they had, on average, higher levels of education than workers
in the formal sector.31 The reasons why educated people are involved in
this sector are quite complex but it does indicate that informal traders
generally possess a level of skill and education that make them formidable entrepreneurs. In this context, the traders stated reasons for their
participation are of particular interest.

REASONS FOR TRADING
The traders were asked why they had entered the business. Some 42%
mentioned survival or income-earning opportunities. Another 29% said
it was because they “enjoyed” trading and self-employment. A further
7% categorised themselves as artists selling their own work.
Traders in Cape Town (particularly asylum seekers and refugees) as
well as women traders were more likely to cite income earning or survival as a reason for starting as informal sector traders. Cape Town
traders were more likely to be refugees and more highly qualified, but
found difficulty obtaining employment which matched their educational qualifications. Consequently they tended to be less satisfied with
their participation in the informal sector than many other traders. A
larger proportion of South Africans (76%) cited survival as their primary reason for entering the sector.
Traders citing survival as a motive made comments like “I need to
survive”, “my mother needed help”, “to earn a living”, “I want to survive”, and “It’s just a means of survival”. Several remarked on the lack
of formal sector job opportunities in their home countries and (in the
case of South Africans and refugees) South Africa itself:
“Yes, I want to be doing something else, but I can’t get a job with my
qualification (accountancy) as I am a foreigner and South Africans get
first preference. I came to Cape Town looking for employment but
couldn’t find any so decided to sell goods.”32
17
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Others had found that formal sector employment did not offer them
the same opportunities. A significant number said that they had entered
the trade as they wanted to be self-employed.
People who had chosen to enter the sector were more likely to have
entrepreneurial aspirations.
“I found it easy for me. I can’t work as a beautician because
the money isn’t good and I don’t want to work like that.
First I sold African clothes in the market, now I am selling
African art in the market and also to other shops and other
traders and I send art to my uncle in the US. But now
there is no more business in the arts so now I want to mix
this work with having a restaurant. I am looking for capital,
but I already have the chef, he is from Belgium.”33
“I am selling something everybody needs like bags and
shoes — I am looking for money to start something bigger
(import/export). I started with R300 of stock now I have
about R15 000-R20 000 (two years later). I already have a
South African (business) partner.”34
A Malawian man noted that he was trading “so I can raise money to
become an importer and exporter”.
Several traders said they had chosen the handicrafts sector because
of their training and talents. Those that had identified themselves as
artists and sculptors emphasised that they were doing what they were
trained to do. The overwhelming majority of this group were
Zimbabwean men. They had been taught wire and metal work at school
and carving at government and private courses in carving. One noted
that “it is my talent and I like doing it”. Another that “I have been
doing wire crafts since I was 12 years old”. A man from Cameroon
noted that mask carving was “in the family”: “My grandfather used to
make these masks so I am trying to keep the tradition.” A South
African told us that he had learned to carve during exile in Zimbabwe
and Botswana.
There is a perception that the informal sector is something of a stopgap for the unemployed who, given the opportunity, would quickly
abandon it for a regular job. Of those interviewed, however, less than
50% were interested in finding formal employment.35 Even those who
had entered the informal sector for survival seemed to have no desire to
get out once they were established. Few of those interested in entering
the formal sector were actually seeking employment (less than 5%). A
small number (four) said they were studying as well as running their
businesses.
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Those uninterested in formal sector employment fall into two categories. The first, and larger group, were content with working as informal sector cross-border traders. They repeated their satisfaction with
self-employment, “independence” and “selling and trading”. The second, smaller group were actively building their enterprises to enable
them to establish businesses both in the informal and formal sector, in
their home countries and in South Africa. A number wanted to expand
their cross trading activities into more formalised import and export
business (based mainly in South Africa). Among the sample were:
• A Malawian man with two stalls selling curios who was returning to Malawi with a commercial ice-cream maker. He intended
to establish an ice-cream selling business in his home town of
Blantyre.
• A Malawian man who was slowly building a construction company in Malawi — “I want to open a construction company...I
am presently buying equipment for the company”. He had been
taking back equipment bought in South Africa with his profits
to establish his new enterprise.
• A Malawian who said “I want to make enough to have a bottle
store, restaurant and rest house in Malawi”. Another said “I just
need money to enlarge my business. I want to raise enough to
start my own business in Malawi”.
• A woman from Zimbabwe who was trading in Cape Town and
building a chicken farm. She said
Table 3:
she already had 100 chickens in
Other
Zimbabwe which were cared for by
SADC
African
her paralysed husband and children:
"always"
2
“I keep doing this so it can be big
1976
1
enough so I can stay at home.”
1984
2
Those who wanted to re-enter formal
1985
2
sector employment tended to have qualifi1986
1
cations that they wanted to use. They
1987
1
included a teacher and electrician from
1988
1
Zimbabwe, a graphic designer from
1989
2
Ethiopia, an airline employee from Sudan,
1990
11
and a woman from the former Zaire with
1991
6
1
two years of medical school.
1992
13
1
Another obvious question is whether
1993
2
2
the non-South African traders have turned
1994
9
4
to the informal sector after entering South
1995
7
6
Africa for other reasons. The traders were
1996
8
17
asked if they had been involved in the same 1997
1
business in their home country and what
unknown
4
3
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work they did before they started trading in curios and handicrafts. The
majority (some 61%) said that they had been involved in the trade in
their home country. Two traders volunteered the information that they
also had stalls in Harare.
The 40% who had not previously been involved in handicrafts trading had engaged in a wide variety of activity. Five had been sales people
in the formal sector, four had sold goods other than curios informally
and eight had been in some form of self-employment.
One Ghanaian salesman started selling clothes in rural areas of
Ghana before coming to South Africa. A Zimbabwean woman ran her
own sewing business. Another “was doing poultry and knitting”. She
still kept her poultry business in Zimbabwe: “I have to work, my husband is paralysed and we have the children.” Others owned a photography business, traded in freezers, and sold ironmongery and hardware.
Three were formerly university students, while one had worked at the
polytechnic in Kenya.
Among the traders there was clear evidence of accumulated expertise and broad international connections:
“I used to trade in Zaire (where I grew up). My family are
also in this business. I have sold in Namibia, Congo. I like
to travel and changing, doing business, buying and selling.
I used to buy in Angola and Congo and sell in Namibia. I
liked Namibia.”36
“I had my own agricultural export company, exporting
beans, seeds and Arabic gum to the Middle East. I left to
come to South Africa in 1995 due to displacement. I would
like to register my company in South Africa.”37
“I am in the exportation business. I make an order, or get
sent an order and export to the USA. I was in the US last
year (Connecticut). I get 100% profit on the orders.”38

CHOOSING SOUTH AFRICA

O

fficial responses to immigration in South Africa tend to
suggest that the numbers of immigrants have increased
significantly since the election of the new government in
1994. In the present sample, this is certainly true of nonSADC traders. The overwhelming majority first arrived
in the post-election period (Table 3).

20

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 6

Traders from the region, however, have been travelling to South
Africa to trade since at least 1990, if not before, as Table 3 shows.39
Their reasons for coming to South Africa (as opposed to elsewhere)
were unsurprising, given the purposeful nature of their migration. Some
27% cited the opportunities offered by South Africa’s tourist market.
Another 24% mentioned the strength of the South African economy or the strength of the rand. About 17% spoke more generally of
South Africa’s attractions (including its new democracy). Refugees with
“no choice” made up 5%, and the remainder cited other factors or had
no specific answer.
Hence, the responses were heavily influenced by participation in the
handicraft curio sector. Some traders also mentioned the absence of a
strong indigenous curio producing sector:
“Business and trading is not doing well elsewhere in Africa.
South Africa is a big tourist country and South Africans
don’t have the ability to do arts and crafts.”
“There are more tourists and it is not landlocked like my
home country. Also my products are not found anywhere in
South Africa so I am providing a service to South Africa.”
There were a large number of comments on the relative strength of
the South African economy and currency. One man said he came
because “the money had good value”. Another because “the rand is the
strongest currency in Africa”. South Africa is “a big free market” and “a
good place with lots of business potential”. Other reasons for preferring
South Africa included its proximity to home and the cheapness of travelling there. Interestingly, only one person said they had come because
they had relatives or friends already trading or living in the country.
Others emphasised the attractions of a new democratic government
and lack of corruption, while others had learned about South Africa
and wanted to see the country. A refugee from Sudan noted: “It is a rich
country, a democracy and you can make anything here — it is an open
country.” A Malian said that he had “read about it in school and liked
the look of it”. One Kenyan called South Africa “a brother country”
and said he came “to mix with South Africans and exchange ideas”.
Another called the country “very bright” because “there’s no corruption”.
Some refugees said they really had no choice: “Circumstances chose
South Africa, I didn’t have much say in it,” said one. “I came here by
accident,” said another. A third, a woman from Zaire, noted: “I didn’t
choose to come. When it was horrible in Zaire the first transport was to
South Africa.”
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TWO-WAY TRADING

T

he trade identified in this study represents but a small slice
of the volume and variety of goods which pass through
South Africa’s border posts. However, with the exception
of agricultural products and other food items (which are
under-represented), interviews with key informants indicate that the range of goods taken across the border by the traders do
reflect more general patterns of informal cross-border trade.40
The overwhelming majority of traders (70%) said that they brought
goods to South Africa. Only 15% said that they definitely did not. The
remainder did not want to answer the question or said it did not apply
to them (mainly refugees and asylum seekers who had settled permanently in South Africa).
Curios, wood and stone carvings as well as raw stone comprise over
90% of the goods imported. The remaining 10% consists of wire (to
make wire goods); doilies, crochet and baskets; and three traders said
they brought clothes and leather goods. Traders in Harare and key informants said that women traders also bring “traditional dresses” to South
Africa. Mozambican cross-border traders bring vegetables eaten in the
Mozambican community, which are unavailable in South Africa;
cashews and other nuts; and cloth.
Most handicrafts and curios sold on South Africa’s streets are
imported as South Africans
produce only a limited range
Table 4: South African-made goods exported
to African countries by traders
of handicrafts and curios
% of
(largely Ndebele and Zulu
Trade Goods
Traders
beadwork, pottery, doilies and Clothes
28
Electronic equipment (TVs, videos,
crochet work). Informal sec15
hi-fi's)
tor traders bringing curios
Appliances (stoves, fridges, washing
15
into South Africa from the
machines)
Shoes
12
region also sell to South
Household
goods
(blankets,
pots,
Africans and other traders.
12
irons etc.)
There is also a prior trade in
Groceries and foodstuffs
8
curios between other states.
Cosmetics and "lotions"
7
Thus, some Zimbabwean
Car parts
6
traders also sell goods from
Cars
5
Zambia and Malawi. Other
Machines/tools
2
sources include wholesalers
Bicycles
2
(or formal sector importers)
Stationary
2
in Johannesburg and Cape
Money for exchange
2
Town. Central and West
Jewellery
1
African curios are brought in
Wines
1
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by traders or are sent by family members and business partners. The
majority are brought in by large-scale importers who pay customs duties
before sale to traders.
Just over 47% of all traders said that they had goods sent to them in
South Africa. Of these, 35% had sent the goods themselves, 28% had
them sent by friends or relatives, 11% had them sent by business partners, and 10% obtained goods sent by other traders. Goods sent from
outside the country, and not carried with traders, were brought by road
(car and bus), rail, and air. Some 19 traders had their goods sent by air,
17 had them sent by road and seven by train. Only two had used the
post office.
Interviewees were asked how they knew what to bring to South
Africa. Most said that they copied what other traders were bringing and
saw what was selling well when they came. A number remarked on the
problem of competition in curio markets. Zimbabwean male carvers and
wire makers “invent” and create new items to expand and sustain the
market. Certainly the range of products of the wire makers has expanded considerably over the past two years.
Some traders were very aware of the spatial unevenness of their market, travelling around the country in search of customers. Six traders
interviewed in Johannesburg in December 1996 were seen again in
Cape Town in January 1997. One trader outlined the route taken by
him and his three friends, all of whom called themselves carvers:
“We go to Johannesburg in November and come to Cape
Town in January. We will stay here, sometimes in town,
sometimes here in Stellenbosch. We don’t have a permanent stall because we want to be able to pack up and go
where the people are. I like to go home in April when its
cold and spend some time with carvers and
family. We come back for Grahamstown and
Table 5:
go to Knysna and Hermanus for the whales.”41
Value
Taking goods back to their home countries to sell
is a significant part of the business of regional traders
in South Africa. Over 56% of all non-South
Africans interviewed said that they took goods out
of South Africa to trade, and only 27% said that
they did not. The majority of those who did not take
goods out were refugees or were new entrants to the
market and/or low income earners. Among the
SADC traders, the proportion of exporters rises to
78%.
Informal sector traders export a wide range of

of
goods
under
R500
1 000

% of
traders
10
9

1 500

4

2 000

21

3 000

17

4 000

9

5 000
6 000

9
4

8 000

9

10 000

6
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South African-made goods to the rest of Africa (Table 4).
The traders were asked how they chose what to take back. Just over
50% said they took orders, either through family members or from
shops. They tended to call home before returning to take orders. One
woman trader who had been a domestic servant in Harare took orders
from her previous employer and their neighbours: “I get orders from the
white people for wine, car parts and things. I go round before I go.”
Others said they simply knew what sold well and was profitable to take,
or observed what others were taking to sell.
Not all took goods to sell. Three said they took things for their family only, while two others said that they took things “especially” for their
family. Regional migrants who did not take goods home with them to
sell or bring them to South Africa are more likely to be young males.
Their non-participation in cross-border trade may reflect either poor
business skills, an inability to negotiate customs and immigration, or
that they may have entered South Africa illegally. As one young male
respondent said: “The border is a problem. If the border wasn’t such a
big problem I would take stuff.”
Quite clearly, the much-maligned foreign trader in South Africa is
also a significant exporter of South African-made goods. Electronics,
appliances, clothes, shoes, household goods, groceries and foodstuffs are
all-important South African products prioritised by industrial policy and
SADC export policy.42 The investment of profits by non-South African
traders in locally manufactured goods shows the interaction between
the formal and informal sectors. It also suggests that informal sector
cross-border trade may have a positive impact on formal sector employment in South Africa. As one respondent said: “If they stop us what
would happen to Oriental Plaza?”43
A small number of traders indicated that they sold to exporters or
people living in the United States and Canada. None had a regular, formal relationship, only once-off or short term arrangements. However,
one Angolan trader said she had a regular arrangement with her uncle
in the United States. She sends him shipments and “I expect him to
send the same value of goods in return”.
This trade also makes a small contribution to VAT revenue as purchases of these goods usually include VAT. Although VAT can be
reclaimed at the border, most said they do not do this as they are paid
in cheques which they would then have to spend at the expensive dutyfree shop “and it’s too much work”.
The traders were asked to estimate the value of goods they took out
of the country. Estimates ranged from R500 to R10 000 (Table 5).
Income-earning activity by non-South Africans in South Africa is
often portrayed as a drain on the country. The information gathered
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from cross-border traders indicates, however, that most profits are recycled into the South African (formal) retail and manufacturing sectors.
Goods are purchased for export and profits are reinvested on the return
of the trader to South Africa.
Supplementary interviews with key informants and officials show
that the informal sector in the cities of countries like Zimbabwe,
Swaziland and Mozambique is closely tied to South Africa’s formal
economy. Citizens of neighbouring states often travel to South Africa to
“shop” for their businesses in the informal (and formal) sector.
Interviews with key informants from Mozambique indicate that people
travel from Maputo and Ressano Garcia to Nelspruit and Swaziland to
purchase goods. They buy car parts, electrical goods, cosmetics, food
stuffs (particularly meat and olive oil), and fruit and vegetables to sell in
the informal sector.
What sort of incomes and profits do the traders command?
Unfortunately, the seasonal and irregular nature of trade, as well as
cross-border trading activities made it difficult to elicit accurate and
comparable estimates. The question is also a sensitive one and answers
may have been inflated or deflated.
Responses varied widely, reflecting the different sizes of businesses
and whether they participated in cross-border trade. Reported incomes
ranged from R800 to R8 000 a month. Most reported incomes of less
than R2 000 a month. One respondent (from Zambia) stated that he
sometimes sold R14 000 or R15 000 worth of goods a month (selling to
curio shops and other traders as well as through his own stall).
Migrants are often viewed as having a negative impact on the South
African economy. This overlooks their wealth-creating capacity as well
as the fact that when in South Africa they pay rent and purchase goods,
food and services.
Estimates of the proportion of income spent in South Africa ranged
widely. Over half said they spent between 40% and 50% of their earnings inside the country.
Most traders prefer to invest their profits in goods to trade across the
border, or more stock, rather than remit money home. Purchase of
goods for trade was a priority for over 85% of traders. New capital was
to be used for expansion, or was invested in the development of
income-earning opportunities in their home country.
Money remitted or left in the home country is invested in business
opportunities, and left there for the support of families and the education of children and siblings.
However, for most traders there is no doubt that reinvestment in
their business is priority.
Refugees spent most of their earnings in South Africa:
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“Sometimes I spend 100%-140% of my profits. Rent is
expensive, then there is water and school fees. I have nine
children and pay R130 per month each for four children at
a Cape Town high school, in Observatory. Then I have
four other children in another high school. I don’t satisfy
my needs in the house. I have problems because all my
family are outside South Africa so I have to employ a
domestic worker.”44
As the research progressed it became apparent that a significant
number of traders employed South Africans. People were employed on
both a full- and part-time basis. All employees identified were women.
In Cape Town the overwhelming majority were from the Eastern Cape.
Employers were more likely to come from countries outside the region.
Nationals may also be employed where employers fear identification by
the police or Home Affairs.

PATTERNS OF INFORMAL TRADING

P

atterns of movement across the South African border vary
enormously. Some traders cross once a year, others as frequently as once a month. Refugees and asylum seekers did not
tend to go back across the border and were therefore largely
unable to participate in cross-border trade as their freedom of
movement is limited.
Most traders return home more than eight times a year. A significant
minority returned less than four times a year. Time spent at home varied
from one week (for regular migrants) to three months. Patterns of
movement are also affected by time limits on visas.
Women traders are more likely to visit South Africa once a month
(usually at the month’s end) for a week or two. Male traders are more
likely to stay for longer periods but still return home regularly.
Patterns of movement are also seasonal. Applications for visas peak
in November and December (peak tourist season and Christmas), and
reach their lowest point in South Africa’s winter months. Not only is
the weather inclement (particularly for street traders), but it is the low
point in the tourist season.45
Cross-border traders who come to South Africa simply to buy goods
tend to make very short trips. A representative of the Indigenous
Business Women’s Organisation interviewed at the High Commission in
Harare said that her co-operative in Bulawayo took three bus loads (68
on each bus) of women from Mashonaland once a month to Louis
Trichardt “only to buy, we don’t encourage selling”. The purpose is “to
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help women to have something to do, a source of income” and to
“encourage women to work”. The organisation has been taking women
to shop in South Africa for over a year on a regular basis, although trips
have been organised for three years.46
The study of women traders in Zimbabwe also found variable and
flexible patterns of movement. Conducted before new procedures relating to the issue of visas were introduced in 1996 (see below), the
women indicated that the length of stay outside Zimbabwe varied from
two days to more than three weeks, with two weeks the most common.
Some made only one trip outside Zimbabwe every six months. Most
went every month or other month. The study also found that traders
were staying outside Zimbabwe for shorter periods in 1993 than in
1992.47
Traders were asked why they did not cross the border more often.
Most felt they already went often enough, or they could not afford to go
more often. Some needed to spend more time trading in South Africa
to build capital or only went “when I need stock”. Others identified the
constraints of transport cost and distance, particularly from Cape Town.
A third group spoke of the obstacles presented by the visa application
procedure and customs duties. Some cited the costs of duties, others the
additional costs of bribery: “I have to bribe the customs officials at the
border.”

IMMIGRANTS OR MIGRANTS?

A

re the traders migrants or immigrants, temporary or permanent residents? The traders were asked if they would
like to stay in South Africa. The responses were variable
and difficult to interpret since there was no time limitation on the question. More instructive perhaps were
responses to the question “where is your permanent home?” Some 71%
identified their home country as their “permanent home” and only 4%
said “South Africa”. Of the 14% who “did not know”, half were
refugees.
Of the 4% who saw South Africa as their permanent home, one said
that it was “only until the war in Sudan ends”. Two who saw their permanent home in their home country said they had applied for permanent residence in South Africa.
One of them (a man from Malawi) said that he did not want his
family to live in South Africa. The other, a Zimbabwean, said: “I want
to stay and do business. I and my children have applied for permanent
residence, but my wife will stay [at home].”
Although public opinion in South Africa seems to suggest that the
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children of African immigrants could be a burden on the education system, this study found that (with the exception of two Mozambican
respondents and refugees who had no option) the overwhelming majority of regional traders wanted their children to be educated in their
home countries.
Significantly, given the allegations that non-South Africans are anxious to settle and bring their families to South Africa, the overwhelming majority of married traders and those with children said they did
not want to, and had no intention of bringing their families to join
them.
Various reasons were given by traders for not wanting their families
to join them. They were “only trading in South Africa”. Others said
that their living conditions were better at home and that they had better property and schools at home. Still others cited cultural differences.
As one Malawian commented: “It is a different culture here. My children would be learning a new culture, not ours.” Others were anxious
about crime and that their children would “get bad habits from tsotsis in
school” or that “it is too dangerous”.
A few did say that they wanted their families to join them. Those
who were most keen were women traders and those whose families were
furthest away. A woman trader from Kenya said that she “would like my
child to be near me, his mother, where he should be”.
Traders from the SADC region said that their families had occasionally visited them and travelled with them. One older Malawian trader
who had started his business in the past year said that he wanted to be
able to bring his wife and children for a visit as he wanted “to show
them South Africa, so they can see all the things that are here. There
are too many things they don’t see in Malawi”.
However, he was adamant that he did not want them to stay permanently as not only did he own a sugar cane holding in Malawi, but he
felt that they should “live in their own culture”.
Not surprisingly, most traders indicated that although they saw their
permanent home in their home country, they wanted to retain access to
South African markets for buying and selling and to sustain their businesses:
“I don’t want to be based here always. I want to be able to
move up and down. I have to look for indigenous craft in
Africa. I can be based here, but I still like Ghana. You can
leave your door open at night, you don’t need a panic button.”48
Others made it clear that they were here for a specific business purpose and some said that they would only trade in South Africa for about
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five years at most, sooner if they could establish a business at home.
Among reasons given for not remaining in South Africa in the longterm were persistent references to the crime situation: “I feel unsafe”;
“the crime rate is too high. Life is very uncertain” and “I am worried
about the future of South Africa”.

SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS TO FOREIGN TRADERS

S

outh African informal sector operatives could always respond
to the presence of non-South African traders by themselves
becoming cross-border traders. This study can do no more
than highlight this possibility as a research and policy issue.
Of our own small sample of 21 South African traders, one
third said that they had travelled outside South Africa to purchase
curios and handicrafts for their business.
One exported goods overseas. Two remarked that although they had
been buying from non-South African traders they had decided they
should try for themselves. One woman trader in Johannesburg said:
I am always going to Zimbabwe. This year I went to
Malawi for the first time — it was good. Yes I will go again.
I started buying things from people here, but now I go outside for things.

The Controller of Customs and the Chief Immigration Officer at the
Lebombo border post said that South Africans comprise a significant
proportion of informal sector traders crossing the border. They said that
the majority were carrying agricultural produce to sell in Ressano
Garcia and Maputo. De Vletter also identifies South African formal and
informal cross-border traders as important suppliers to informal sector
fruit and vegetable sellers in Maputo.49
A more pervasive response, however, seems to be outspoken and
active hostility to the participation of non-South Africans in street
trading. City Council officials in Johannesburg and Cape Town said
they received strong representations from South African traders’ associations to stop non-South Africans obtaining licences and selling on the
street.50 The traders’ associations actually represent only a small percentage of traders (less than 10%) and often have their own political agendas.51 Nonetheless, traders who are not members of associations may
sympathise with the aims of associations, and some may be coerced into
acting with them.
In stark contrast to the actions and sentiments of South African
traders in Johannesburg in August 1997, those we interviewed had
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mainly positive things to say about both immigration and migrant street
traders. However, their opinions may have been influenced by involvement in a sector traditionally dominated by non-South Africans and by
interaction with non-South Africans who supply them with stock. Of
those interviewed, 50% expressed positive or tolerant attitudes towards
migrant traders coming to South Africa. Less than 10% held strongly
negative views.
These positive attitudes were, in turn, reflected in the responses of
non-South Africans. Some said that they had been subject to abuse by
South Africans generally but the overwhelming majority said that their
relationships with South African traders were good.
However, perhaps reflecting increasingly active opposition to nonSouth African street traders and their location in Hillbrow and the
CBD of Johannesburg, all but one Mozambican interviewed said that
they had experienced hostility from South Africans.

REGULATING TRADE
VISA POLICY

O

ne of the defining features of informal sector activity is its
unregulated character.52 Nonetheless, participants in the
sector do encounter a number of statutory bodies and regulations in the course of their activities.53 The informal
traders interviewed in this study have to negotiate government regulations and officialdom at various levels.
Under current South African immigration policy (as codified in the
Aliens Control Amendment Act of 1995), there is no such thing as a
“trading permit”. Refugees and asylum seekers hold temporary residence
permits issued under Section 41 of the Act which allows them to trade
in the informal sector. Informal cross-border traders do not qualify for
business, work seeking or work permits either. The majority of SADC
traders and street vendors therefore appear to enter under visitors visas
and permits. Visitors visas are free to Zimbabwean citizens, but
Mozambican citizens must pay R140 per permit. Officials at the South
African High Commission in Harare and the Embassy in Maputo confirmed that that the majority of applicants are traders.54 According to
one source, as many as 90%-95% of women applicants for visas in
Harare were going to trade or buy goods in South Africa.55
Handicrafts traders are not, by and large, border jumpers. To conduct
their business, they need visas to enter South Africa. Most take the bus
to the border and then the train or taxis to their destination, crossing
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through official border points. It is difficult to carry large quantities of
stone and wood carvings and metal through illegal entry points. Also,
most trade in public places, which makes legality a desired status.
While visitors’ visas allow traders to enter South Africa, they do not
officially permit them to trade. In many cases issuing officers and immigration officials at the border are perfectly aware that the applicant will
trade once in South Africa, but issue the permits anyway. Traders are
thus in an ambiguous position; they have entered the country legally,
but are not allowed to trade under the conditions of their visas. The
confusion was articulated by one respondent:
“Why do they issue us with visitors permits when they
know we will trade. If they don’t want us to sell then they
shouldn’t let us bring our goods with us. They should just
let us bring our handbags.”56
In July 1996, in a zealous attempt to deal with what the Department
of Home Affairs claims are large numbers of undocumented migrants in
South Africa as well as large numbers of applicants for visas, the government imposed tough new visa restrictions on all Zimbabweans. Since
then, the South African High Commission in Harare has only issued
single entry visas. Visa applicants now have to provide bank statements
showing they have sufficient funds, and letters of invitation from friends
or relatives in South Africa.57 Multiple entry visas are only issued in
Harare in “special circumstances”. The procedure is costly and timeconsuming for everyone involved.
The new regulations are particularly problematic for traders as they
have to re-apply each trip since many travel once a month to South
Africa. As a female trader waiting at the High Commission pointed out:
“I come from Mutare (250km away), I may sleep here three
nights before I get a visa, then its only a single entry. Then
I go back to Mutare to get my things, then I take the bus to
Beit Bridge.”
Other traders bring their goods with them and leave from Harare,
but still said “we need a multiple entry so we can go every month”. The
letter requirement is an unrealistic expectation for those intending to
make short visits. Not surprisingly, a vibrant industry in fraudulent letters has developed in the streets outside the South African High
Commission.58 The validity of a visa is arbitrarily set by the issuing officer. According to interviewees in Harare, the time given rarely agrees
with the time asked for. A spokeswoman for waiting applicants said:
“The visa is a big problem. You don’t know if they will give
you five days or three weeks. One will get five days, anoth-
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er a week, another one month. We all come with the same
papers and get asked the same, but we get different visas.”
The validity of the visa can be further reduced by immigration officers issuing entry permits at the border.59
The single-entry, short-term visa poses significant business restrictions on cross-border traders. As one man noted: “I get very little time
on my visas to spend in South Africa so I have to trade quickly and
leave.” A Zimbabwean woman said that she had “to leave on Tuesday so
I am selling everything cheap. You don’t know how long they will give
you. If they give you a short time it is difficult.”
The workload of the Visa Section at the South African High
Commission is heavy and has become even more onerous since the new
restrictions were imposed. This is despite the fact that the visa policy
has become a rather transparent attempt to reduce the number of people travelling to South Africa from Zimbabwe. The High Commission
sees between 350 to 400 people per day on busy days (less than 200 on
others) and processes between 1 000 to 2 000 postal applications a
week.60 Most applications are for visitors’ visas. The new procedures
have certainly reduced the number of applications received.
Applications received between January and July 1997 had declined by
27% from the equivalent period in 1996. The number of refused applications increased by 120% over the same period. In September 1996,
the number of refusals reached a peak 14 times higher than the monthly
average prior to the introduction of the new procedures.61
CUSTOMS
All persons entering South Africa are allowed a single R500 duty free
allowance of personal goods. All other goods are subject to duties which
are calculated according to a complex set of regulations.
Some 63% of traders interviewed said they had problems with customs officials. Many find the high cost of duties a problem, though this
was “mainly with South African customs, they say what the price is,
usually duty is another 30% of the price paid”. Some resented the haggling with customs officials at the border, the bribery and overcharging:
“Sometimes I have problems. One time they wanted to
charge me piece by piece, I negotiated but they still
charged me an exorbitant price.”
“I don’t like the way they search you and they over-charge.”
“There are the high prices of duties on everything and they
may want bribes.”
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“Duty isn’t constant, it depends on the mood of the officer.
And then there is corruption.”
“The railway people are the worst, they are rude. They
charge R200 but write R50. If you complain then they just
say do you want me to make you pay more?”
The customs duties received by the South African government come
with hidden costs to traders:
• Duties paid at the border when importing and exporting goods
are a significant cost to traders and a drain on their already
small profit margins (to the extent that duties limit their ability
to trade across the border).
• Allegations that duties seem to be imposed arbitrarily or that different duties can be levied on the same amount of goods, cause
confusion and resentment.
• Some officials are either not charging properly, or acting dishonestly. Small traders are in a vulnerable position when trying to
cross the border as they lack the resources, time and money to
pursue legal avenues of complaint.
They also come with costs to the Department of Customs and
Excise:
• Complex tariff schedules are difficult to administer and carry a
cost in time and paperwork for officials who have to extrapolate
the correct duties for the correct goods.
• Tariff schedules still reflect apartheid regional relationships relating to differential bilateral tariff and trade agreements between
South Africa and other SADC countries.
• The amounts of goods being carried mean duties paid are
insignificant (comparative to formal sector trade) given all the
effort involved to collect them.

TRADING PERMITS AND LICENCES
Both the Johannesburg and Cape Town Metropolitan Councils are currently trying to re-organise and develop new policies regarding street
trading and the issuing of licences. Currently most traders on the pavements do not hold licences, but have other forms of permission to trade.
In Cape Town large trading areas are leased to trading associations
which then issue permits to sell. Traders in Cape Town indicated that at
certain sites permits were not issued to non-South Africans.62 In the
Johannesburg CBD, the Anglo-American Corporation leases pavement
space to South African citizens, but many then sub-let their space to
non-South Africans for much higher rents.63 City Council officials are
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VIGNETTE C
THE RESPECTED SCULPTOR
Raphael Mavudzi was not the first visitor to South Africa from
north of the border to fail to have his papers in order. Nor was he
the first to be arrested for that failure, under the Aliens Control
Act, and thrown into the dismal holding cells of the Sea Point police
station. But unlike the six men packed into the tiny cell with him,
waiting for the police to take some action, Mavudzi, a respected
sculptor from Zimbabwe, knew he had the right to a lawyer. And a
series of phone calls from friend to friend brought Cape Town attorney Gary Eisenberg to his cell. Mavudzi, who had been invited to
South Africa in April by the Bartel Arts Trust in Durban, had been
in police custody for two days by the time Eisenberg got to him, following a tip-off from a friend.
“The conditions were appalling and unhygenic,” said Mavudzi
at the weekend, just before he flew home, “The blankets were wet
with pee and there was garbage on the floor...we had to beg them
for a broom to sweep it up. The police did not treat us with dignity.
The food was awful — there were no washing facilities. We had to
buy our own drinks.”
By the time Eisenberg had got Mavudzi out of the cell, the rest
of the men in the cell had signed themselves up as his clients. Until
they had met Mavudzi, none had known they were entitled to legal
counsel, or that they could challenge the law under which they were
held on its lack of constitutionality. Nobody had read them their
rights.
“I went to the cells and saw a bunch of people in little cages,”
Eisenberg said. “Some of the people I spoke to had valid holiday
permits, but had been arrested on suspicion of working or hawking
illegally. Home Affairs did not interview the people they were holding in the cells and it is clear from what I saw they do not assess
each case on its own merits.”
Mavudzi said negotiations between Eisenberg and the Barrack
Street Home Affairs Department had been slow because they had
not been able to raise anybody on Friday. Most senior officials were
at a party to bid farewell to a senior director who was leaving to set
up a private immigration consultancy. Between cellphone calls to
Home Affairs officials, Eisenberg started chatting to Mavudzi about
his artwork and soon they were swopping notes on Cubism, Picasso
and the influence of African art on European artists. Eisenberg
offered to provide a R1 900 deposit to Home Affairs to release
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Mavudzi (the deposit is supposed to be refunded once Mavudzi
crosses the border) and helped Mavudzi buy his air ticket to
Harare. He also gave Mavudzi cash, which Eisenberg said he needed because he could not return to his wife and son empty-handed.
In exchange, Mavudzi sold Eisenberg a sculpture, and left a number behind for Eisenberg to sell for him through tourist shops. The
sculptures fetch between R15 000 and R30 000.
Mavudzi came to South Africa six months ago, invited by art
gallery curators to conduct stone sculpture workshops with victims
of the KwaZulu/Natal war as part of rehabilitation therapy. He displayed two sculptures at the Zimbabwe National Gallery in 1993
and 1994.
The acting exhibition director, Rose West, said the works were
original, and differed from curio-type sculptures. The sculptures
had been called The Bomb-blast Victim and The Sleep-walker.
Mavudzi was to have done a further workshop at the South African
National Gallery in Cape Town this week. But officials had refused
to give him a work permit because he was an artist. He had to travel instead on a holiday visa.
“It’s very difficult to come to South Africa from Zimbabwe. I do
rehabilitative work with young people of all races and art to me has
no boundaries,” he said. “It’s not because I want to leave my country that I’m here, but because I want to expand my knowledge and
share my experience with all people.”
Eisenberg organised the release of the rest of the other detainees
on condition that they would see themselves out of the country by
train. He said this week that he will make it a habit to check on the
holding cells from time to time. His anger is not directed at the
Home Affairs officials, but at the law that prompts and governs
their actions, which he says is unconstitutional.
“The Constitution says nobody can be detained after arrest for
longer than 48 hours, but the Act allows Home Affairs to detain
immigrants indefinitely without them being formally charged,” he
adds.
“Home Affairs officials say they persist in following this rule
because it is practice, although they know about the constitutional
provisions. Their loyalty is to the carrying out of the law, but since
the law itself is rotten, this leads to all kinds of irregularities.”
Said Home Affairs officials: “We went out of our way to treat
him in a fair and reasonable manner.” Police said they treat “all
detainees well”.
Source: Marion Edmunds, “Foreign artist held at police whim”
Mail & Guardian, 7 March 1997.
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reluctant to do the work of Home Affairs and Safety and Security, but
their most vociferous constituents place pressure on them not to issue
licenses and sites to non-South Africans.64 Zimbabweans trading in
Cape Town said that they “suffered” from Home Affairs officials:
“The immigration people disturb us, they choose us
(Zimbabweans) only and say we mustn’t sell. They don’t
arrest us. But we have to pay bribes to some. They can
come any time, any minute, any day. ... If you leave money
in your passport they take it.”65
Some traders also reported that the police attempt to elicit bribes.
Several said that the police had taken their documents and then
demanded money. Bribes paid ranged from R50 to R300. Others said
that the police searched them and took what money they could find.
Traders who are arrested are regularly subjected to harsh and unconstitutional treatment (see Vignette C).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

T

he inherited system of migration control in South Africa
makes no special provisions for informal cross-border trade
and is increasingly at odds with the more general attempt
within Southern Africa to break down trade barriers within
the region and to free up regional trade. Why, it has to be
asked, should South African business be allowed to open stores and
supermarkets in neighbouring states, while small traders from those
states are hounded off the streets of South Africa? On the ground, at
border posts and in customs sheds, there is an implicit recognition of
the need to facilitate cross-border trade, whether it be formal or informal. Traders who are obviously entering South Africa and returning
home with trade goods are allowed entry on visitors permits, primarily
because the archaic Aliens Control Act makes no provision for the de
facto reality of growing interaction.
The present system has negative consequences for both the South
African government and non-South African traders:
• The costs and difficulties in obtaining visas add significantly to
the running costs of these small businesses in both time and
money.
• The system creates uncertainty for traders as they are unsure if,
when and for how long they will be allowed to enter South
Africa, hampering their ability to trade and plan.
• It places many people, who because of their business interests,
would like to regularise their status to enable them to pursue
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•

•

their business legally in an ambiguous legal position. Bribery and
extortion are the inevitable consequence.
The ambiguous use of visitors visas makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for the Department of Home Affairs to monitor and
regulate patterns of migration as there is no way of distinguishing between visitors, traders and those using visitors visas to
seek employment.
The use of single entry visas creates work for hard-pressed Home
Affairs officials as individuals apply repeatedly (often every
month) to have their permits renewed.

TRADING PERMITS
The creation of a new temporary permit category for individual informal sector cross-border traders, as recommended in the Draft Green
Paper on International Migration, should therefore be seriously considered.66
The permit could be limited to citizens of SADC countries or extended
to citizens of other countries.
Such a traders’ permit would allow traders to sell in the informal sector and allow multiple entry. This would reduce administrative costs
and release Home Affairs and embassy officials to deal with more pressing immigration concerns. Like other temporary permits (eg work,
study, visitors, business), the trading permit would recognise another of
the multiple reasons that people enter South Africa. It would also
remove the ambiguous status of non-South African traders, remove
opportunities for corruption and improve the regulation and management of the system. So, for example, those abusing the right to enter for
trading purposes could be identified and have their permits withdrawn.
Reciprocal trading permits (bilateral or multilateral) should be negotiated to enable South African traders similar access to regional markets.

CUSTOMS AND EXCISE DUTIES
The current system of levying duties on informal traders is inconsistent and imposes a heavy burden. It dissuades rather than encourages
regional trade and will not encourage ordinary South Africans to get
involved in trading across borders:
• Customs and excise duties are a heavy burden to informal crossborder traders, whether South African or non-South African.
Unlike their formal sector counterparts, they are not always eligible for reductions in duties under bilateral trade agreements as
their consignments are too small. Duty-free allowances do not
cover their needs.
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•

The collection of duties from informal sector traders is a heavy
burden for Customs and Excise officials who have to calculate,
collect and administer the charging of duties on small amounts
of goods. The cost of charging duty may exceed the duty exacted. Customs officials who could be searching for illegal goods
such as drugs and guns instead fritter away their time charging
insignificant duties on small amounts of goods.
The introduction of a duty-free allowance on goods worth, say, less
than R15 000 for persons holding a trading permit would eliminate
some of these problems.67 Such an allowance would:
• Reduce administrative costs in time and money to the
Department of Customs and Excise who waste time, money and
paper processing (relatively) small amounts of levied duties.
• Free customs officials to concentrate their efforts on the smuggling of illegal goods.
• Reduce opportunities for corruption by dishonest officials.
• Encourage the development of small businesses.
Again, reciprocal arrangements should be negotiated with neighbouring countries to ensure that South African traders are not disadvantaged. Criteria would have to be carefully examined to ensure that
formal sector importers and exporters do not abuse the introduction of
trading visas by employing individuals to bring goods across the border.

EDUCATION AND TRAINING FOR SOUTH AFRICAN TRADERS
The recent attacks on non-South African street traders by South
Africans indicates that the latter feel threatened by competition. Black
South African entrepreneurship was suppressed by apartheid which, by
restricting movement and banning informal sector activity, disrupted
trading networks and marketing skills. South African entrepreneurs are
now having to develop new business skills. However, it is questionable
whether the draconian removal of non-South African traders will provide a solution or remove “competition”.
A more productive strategy would be to introduce training for South
African informal sector traders in accounting and marketing skills. The
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council is to introduce such training for
informal sector entrepreneurs, and if successful it may help them use
their “local” advantages in a competitive market. South African traders
may also be able to learn skills from partnerships with their non-South
African counterparts.
Access to start up capital and finance for expansion is difficult to
obtain for many participants in the informal sector. Consideration could
also be given to the provision of micro-finance for South African informal sector traders.
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South Africa produces only a small range of handicrafts and curios
for sale to both the tourist and internal market. The Zimbabwean government provides training opportunities for traders (among others) to
enable them to learn skills so that they can make and not only sell
curios and handicrafts.
The Department of Arts and Culture could offer similar encouragement to the development of South African traditional skills in arts and
crafts and the ways that these could be “exploited” for the growing
tourist market. Consideration should also be given to the development
of training centres which would allow artists to develop their skills.
They would also train artisans to produce handicrafts and curios rooted
in South Africa’s history and cultures which could be sold in the handicraft/curio sector.
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APPENDIX: LIST OF EXTENDED INTERVIEWS
Anonymous Kenyan trader (m), Cape Town, 3 February 1997.
Anonymous Ghanaian (m), Johannesburg, 15 September 1996.
Anonymous Mozambican trader (f), Johannesburg, 4 April 1997.
Anonymous Mozambican (m), Johannesburg, 14 May 1997.
Anonymous Mozambican (f), Johannesburg, 3 August 1997.
Anonymous Mozambican (m), Johannesburg, 3 August 1997.
Anonymous Zambian (m), Johannesburg, 15 October 1996.
Anonymous Zimbabwean trader (m), Johannesburg, 8 August 1996.
Anonymous Zimbabwean trader (f), Johannesburg, 8 September 1996.
Anonymous Zimbabwean (m), Johannesburg, 15 October 1996.
Anonymous Zimbabwean (f), Johannesburg, 10 September 1996.
Badenhorst, I, Chief Immigration Officer, Lebombo Border Post, 3
March 1997.
Brewis, A, Acting First Secretary for Immigration, South African High
Commission, Harare, Zimbabwe, 25 April 1997.
Human, L, Chief Controller of Customs and Excise, Lebombo Border
Post, 3 March 1997.
Meiring, J, First Secretary for Immigration, South African High
Commission, Maputo, Mozambique, 27 August 1997.
Mueller, C, Department of Urban Planning, Cape Town City Council,
31 January 1997.
Mupanda, H.L, Indigenous Business Women’s Organisation, Harare,
Zimbabwe, 25 April 1997.
Pernegger, L, Urban Planning Department, Johannesburg
Administration, Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, 23
August 1996 and 12 February 1997.
Philbrick, A, architect (consultant to Johannesburg Administration,
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council), 2 September 1996 and 4
June 1997.
Other nationals of Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Ghana,
Senegal and Mali - traders and non-traders - provided valuable background information in informal (but informed) interviews during the
course of the project.
Brief interviews were also conducted with two of the clearing agents
working outside the border post at Lebombo.
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FOOTNOTES
1 R Davies, “The Impact of Trade on Migration in SADC”, Briefing paper presented to the Green Paper Task Group on International Migration, January
1997.
2 A study of the participation of women in the informal sector in Harare conducted between 1992 and 1993 included interviews with female Zimbabwean
cross-border traders. See V Brand, R Mupedziswa and P Gumbo, “Structural
Adjustment, Women and Informal Trade in Harare” In P Gibbon, ed.,
Structural Adjustment and the Working Poor in Zimbabwe Uppsala: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet, 1995. F de Vletter, “The Informal Sector in Maputo and
Beira” Consultancy Report, Maputo, 1997, refers to South African and
Mozambican cross-border traders as sources of goods for the informal sector in
Mozambique.
3 R Davies, op cit., pp 4. Department of Customs and Excise, Monthly Abstract
of Trade Statistics, January-December, 1993-1996, Table 3. The SACU
includes Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. The
countries of the SADC are currently renegotiating trade and tariff agreements. The lengthy negotiation process reflects the complexity of regional
trade networks.
4 R Davies, op cit., pp 4-5.
5 Department of Customs and Excise, Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics,
January-December, for the years 1993-1996, Table 3.
6 R Davies, op cit., pp 5.
7 R Davies, op cit., pp 4.
8 A Bouillon, “‘New’ African immigration to South Africa.” Paper presented to
the South African Sociological Association Conference, Durban, 7-11 July
1996, pp 4-5.
9 Department of Customs and Excise, Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics,
January-December, 1996, pp 213.
10 Department of Customs and Excise, Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics,
January-December, 1996, pp 211.
11 A Bouillon, op cit., pp 4.
12 Department of Customs and Excise, Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics,
January-December, 1996, pp 213.
13 World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead,
Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994. Attempts to define the “informal sector” have proved to be problematic as the term covers a wide range of economic activities. An International Labour Organisation (ILO) report in 1988
suggested that the main characteristics of the informal sector are “activities in
the lower-end of small-scale enterprises, with self-employment and very limited initial capital”. Other characteristics associated with informal economic
activity are, being outside the regulatory framework, low productivity and
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incomes, instability, employment of family members or few workers, and that
the activity is a route to economic survival rather than a chosen income earning opportunity. These definitions imply marginality, disguising the significant
disparities in the size and income earning potential of such activities as well as
their contribution to national economies. See International Labour
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